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Recent papers by Busza et al. (BJSW) and Dar et al. (DDH) argue that astrophysical data can
be used to establish small bounds on the risk of a “killer strangelet” catastrophe scenario in the
RHIC and ALICE collider experiments. The case for the safety of the experiments set out by BJSW
does not rely solely on these bounds, but on theoretical arguments, which BJSW find sufficiently
compelling to firmly exclude any possibility of catastrophe.
Nonetheless, DDH and other commentators (initially including BJSW) suggested that these em-
pirical bounds alone do give sufficient reassurance. This seems unsupportable when the bounds
are expressed in terms of expectation value — a good measure, according to standard risk analysis
arguments. For example, DDH’s main bound, pcatastrophe < 2× 10
−8, implies only that the expec-
tation value of the number of deaths is bounded by 120; BJSW’s most conservative bound implies
the expectation value of the number of deaths is bounded by 60000.
This paper reappraises the DDH and BJSW risk bounds by comparing risk policy in other areas.
For example, it is noted that, even if highly risk tolerant assumptions are made and no value is
placed on the lives of future generations, a catastrophe risk no higher than ≈ 10−15 per year would
be required for consistency with established policy for radiation hazard risk minimization. Allowing
for risk aversion and for future lives, a respectable case can be made for requiring a bound many
orders of magnitude smaller.
In summary, the costs of small risks of catastrophe have been significantly underestimated by
BJSW (initially), by DDH and by other commentators. Future policy on catastrophe risks would
be more rational, and more deserving of public trust, if acceptable risk bounds were generally
agreed ahead of time and if serious research on whether those bounds could indeed be guaranteed
was carried out well in advance of any hypothetically risky experiment, with the relevant debates
involving experts with no stake in the experiments under consideration.
PACS numbers: 25.75.-q, 87.52.Px, 06.60.Wa, 01.52.+r
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I. INTRODUCTION
Speculative suggestions are occasionally made about ways in which new physics experiments could hypothetically
bring about a catastrophe leading to the end of life on Earth. Some of these hypothetical catastrophes, including
the “killer strangelet” scenario considered in this paper, would also lead to the destruction of the planet and wider
catastrophic consequences. In any case, the proposed catastrophe mechanisms generally rely on speculation about
hypothetical phenomena for which there is no evidence, but which at first sight do not contradict the known laws of
physics. Sometimes, such pessimistic hypotheses can be countered by arguments which show that the existence of the
catastrophe mechanism is highly improbable, either because closer analysis shows that the proposed mechanism does
in fact contradict well established physical principles, or because its existence would imply effects which we should
almost certainly have observed but have not.
Unfortunately, there is a difficulty in making an argument of this type sufficiently reassuring. One would like to be
reassured that the chances of inadvertently triggering a global catastrophe are very small indeed before going ahead
with an experiment. But finding arguments which justify this conclusion with the appropriate level of confidence may
be very hard, if not impossible. Discouragingly few attempts to grapple with this issue have been made. In fact, even
the obvious and fundamental question — how improbable does a catastrophe have to be to justify proceeding with an
experiment? — seems never to have been seriously examined. The aim of this paper is to face this question squarely,
in the hope of stimulating further debate.
The particular stimulus for this paper was the debate over the safety of the RHIC supercollider experiments
now underway at Brookhaven, and the ALICE experiments proposed by CERN. Speculation about possible disaster
scenarios in these experiments led to some pressure for the experiments to be deferred or cancelled. In response,
reports and papers were written that were used to justify commencing the RHIC experiments on the grounds that,
inter alia, “Cosmic ray collisions provide ample reassurance that we are safe from a . . . catastrophe at RHIC” [1] and
“Beyond reasonable doubt, heavy-ion experiments at RHIC will not endanger our planet.” [2]. Here I will contend
that the risk bounds obtained are actually not small, taking into account the scale of the catastrophe, either according
to standard risk analysis or when compared with other adopted standards for acceptable risk to the public. Since the
criteria used by Brookhaven to justify proceeding were developed by theoretical physicists and administrators, not by
broader representatives of the public or by professionals in risk management, it seems desirable to bring these issues
before a wider audience for the purposes of informed discussion and the formation of sounder public policy in future.
II. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES
The first catastrophe mechanism seriously considered seems to have been the possibility, raised in the 1940s at Los
Alamos before the first atomic bomb tests, that fission or fusion bombs might ignite the atmosphere or oceans in an
unstoppable chain reaction. Investigation led to an analysis by Konopinski et al. [3] which fairly definitively refuted
the possibility. Compton was later reported, in a published interview [4] with Pearl Buck, as saying that he had
decided not to proceed with the bomb tests if it were proved that the chances of global catastrophe were greater than
three in a million, but that in the event calculation proved the figures slightly less.
It is hard to understand how any meaningful calculation could have produced such a risk figure. The analysis of
Ref. [3] gives convincing arguments against the possibility of a catastrophic chain reaction, based on well established
physical principles. It concludes that it is unreasonable to expect a chain reaction propagated by nitrogen-nitrogen
fusion reactions, and that an unlimited chain reaction consuming the atmosphere is less likely still. Other possible
reactions, involving protons in clouds of steam liberated from the oceans, are also considered and argued to be less
dangerous still. Konopinski et al. do note the “distant probability” that the mode of propagation of the reaction
in the atmosphere might be more complicated than their analysis allows, in which case its conclusions might not
apply, and they suggest that the complexity of their argument and the absence of a satisfactory experimental basis
for it makes further work on the subject highly desirable. However, they offer nothing resembling a catastrophe risk
estimate, nor any results from which a quantitative estimate could be derived.
Yet, so far as I know, Compton never made an attempt to correct Buck’s account. Had she simply misunderstood,
it would have been easy for Compton to disclaim the statement. And, had it not reflected his views, he would surely
have wanted both to set the historical record straight and to defend his reputation against the charge of unwisely
gambling with the future of humanity. The natural inference seems to be that Compton did indeed make the statement
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reported.1 If so, although the risk figure itself appears unjustifiable, Compton presumably genuinely believed that an
actual risk (not just a risk bound) of 3 × 10−6 of global catastrophe was roughly at the borderline of acceptability,
in the cause of the American and allied effort to develop atomic weapons during World War Two. Apparently the
figure did not worry 1959 American Weekly readers greatly, since no controversy ensued. It would be interesting to
compare current opinion on the acceptability of a 3× 10−6 risk of global catastrophe, in the circumstances of the Los
Alamos project or otherwise.
Another hypothetical catastrophe was examined some time ago by Hut and Rees [6,7]. They considered the possi-
bility that the vacuum state we live in is not the true vacuum, but merely a local minimum of the effective potential.
They asked whether, if this were the case, new generations of collider experiments could trigger a catastrophic tran-
sition to the true vacuum, destroying not only the Earth but (eventually) all presently stable forms of matter in the
cosmos. They showed that the probability of this occurring artificially in present or foreseeable collider experiments
is considerably smaller than the probability of it having occurred naturally within our past light-cone.2
Most recently, in response to some (rather unfocussed) public concern [9], the possibility of some catastrophe arising
from prospective experiments at the Brookhaven relativistic heavy ion collider (RHIC) was reviewed by Busza et al.
(BJSW) and Dar et al. (DDH).3 Both groups paid most attention to the “killer strangelet” catastrophe scenario,
which would arise if negatively charged metastable strange matter existed and could be produced in the experiments.
As well as giving theoretical arguments against the hypotheses involved, both groups offer risk bounds inferred from
empirical evidence. BJSW’s proposed bounds on the probability of catastrophe during the ten year lifetime of RHIC,
derived from the survival of the Moon for 4.5 billion years, range from 10−5 to 2×10−11, depending on how conservative
the assumptions made are [8]. DDH’s bounds, derived from the observed rate of supernovae, range from 2 × 10−6
(their pessimistic bound for a very slow catastrophe, in which the Earth is prematurely destroyed at some point in
the billion years before it would anyway be consumed by the expanding Sun) to 2× 10−8 (their main bound) [2].
As the quotations extracted in Section IV attest, both groups originally [1,2] suggested their empirical bounds alone
were adequate to show that the experiments were safe. If correct, this conclusion would obviously be particularly
welcome, since it would remove any need to evaluate the degree of confidence which should be placed in the theoretical
arguments. The view that the empirical bounds were indeed adequate was also expressed in commentaries [12,13].
However, there are good reasons, explained below, to believe that this conclusion is incorrect, and indeed the claim
was withdrawn by BJSW, after criticisms from the author of this paper. BJSW produced a second version of their
preprint, removing the reassuring characterisations of their risk bounds and instead disavowing any attempt to decide
what is an acceptable upper bound on pcatastrophe. In this revised version, BJSW also accept that the arguments for
their empirically derived risk bounds could be invalidated if some additional pessimistic hypotheses were correct.4
BJSW’s revision of their preprint was an adequate response, from a purely scientific perspective. The public policy
implications are troubling, however. My understanding is that the US government’s authorisation for the RHIC
experiments to proceed was given partly on the basis of BJSW’s original arguments [1], whose discussions of risk
were gravely flawed, as the quotations considered in Section IV illustrate. Public concern was countered by widely
publicised [10,11] reassurances [12,13] that the risk was negligible, also relying heavily on the risk appraisals given in
BJSW’s original preprint [1]. As far as I am aware, no effort was made by Brookhaven to reobtain authorisation on
the basis of BJSW’s revised assessment, or to bring what is a significantly revised case to media and public attention.5
In my opinion, such efforts should have been made.
1In April 2000, in an attempt to understand this puzzling statement of Compton’s, I contacted Hans Bethe, a key figure
in both the Los Alamos project and the theoretical work which led to the conclusion that the possibility of an atomic bomb
explosion leading to global catastrophe was negligible. His view, relayed by an intermediary (Kurt Gottfried), was that the
analysis of Konopinski et al. was definitive and does not allow one to make any meaningful statement about probabilities since
the conditions that must be met cannot be reached in any plausible manner. Bethe suggested that the 3 × 10−6 figure was
made up by Compton “off the top of his head”, and is “far, far too large” [5].
2These results are reviewed in Ref. [8]. Whether they offer adequate reassurance that no forseeable collider experiment will
be unacceptably risky deserves reconsideration in the light of the arguments set out below.
3DDH also considered the ALICE experiments, scheduled to take place later at CERN. Their bounds on the risk of catastrophe
ensuing from ALICE will not be considered here, though it is worth noting that even DDH regard them as inadequate and
suggest further investigation.
4Some further possible loopholes in those arguments are listed in Ref. [14].
5Indeed, the Brookhaven web pages continue, in April 2003, to direct readers to the original unamended version of BJSW’s
preprint: see http://www.bnl.gov/rhic/docs/rhicreport.pdf.
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It should be noted that BJSW stress [8] in the revised version of their paper that they regard the theoretical
arguments alone as sufficiently compelling. This may be a defensible position, but it is not the case that was originally
made and publicised.
III. SCOPE OF THIS PAPER
This paper is meant as a contribution to the debates over hypothetical catastrophe scenarios in the RHIC and
ALICE collider experiments and over other hypothetical or real global catastrophe risks. It focusses on the key
question: what risk of catastrophe could be acceptable? Other relevant questions are not considered. In particular,
in the case of the collider experiments, no attempt is made to infer quantitative risk bounds from the qualitative
theoretical arguments against the possibility of catastrophe, or to consider BJSW’s conclusion that the theoretical
arguments alone offer sufficiently compelling reassurance [1,8].
The interest in this debate is not, of course, purely or mainly intellectual. The aim is to improve future policy
over catastrophe risks. In particular, lessons can and should be learned from the evident flaws in BJSW’s and DDH’s
discussions of risk. It is obviously unsatisfactory that the question of what constitutes an acceptable catastrophe risk
should continue to be decided, in an ad hoc way, according to the personal risk criteria of scientists whom those in
charge of experimental facilities choose to consult. Those criteria, however sincerely held and thoughtfully constructed,
may be unrepresentative of general opinion or of expert opinion in risk analysis.
Worse still, history suggests the risk criteria actually used may not be at all thoughtfully constructed. Compton’s
reported opinion suggests, and the mischaracterisations of Refs. [1] and [2] illustrate very clearly, that scientists whose
expertise is not in risk analysis or public policy cannot necessarily be relied on either to interpret the risk implications
of the science correctly or to consider elementary arguments that tend to suggest more cautious risk criteria than can
easily be satisfied. Relying on such inexpert appraisals is neither in the public interest nor the long term interests of
science. Scientists and scientific institutions need to work to gain, maintain and justify public trust. Arguments which
suggest that an experiment should proceed simply because the global catastrophe risk appears fairly low, without
comparison to any pre-existing thresholds or guidelines, may not only fail to reassure, but may (not unreasonably)
be interpreted as public relations exercises, intended to support a prejudged conclusion, rather than dispassionate
scientific analyses. As Calogero notes [18], this has a long term cost for the credibility on questions of risk not only of
those directly involved, but of all scientists, and the likely long term consequence is less informed and more irrational
public debate and public policy.
It may well not be possible to reach a complete consensus on firm guidelines. It seems unlikely, for instance, that
some clear agreement will emerge that global catastrophe risks are small enough to be of negligible concern if and only
if lower than, say, 10−20. Life is more complicated than that, and democratic debate more multi-faceted. Nonetheless
— indeed, for this very reason — it would be valuable to have a spectrum of carefully argued opinion in the literature.
I hope that the arguments below may spark further discussion.
IV. BJSW AND DDH’S RISK BOUNDS FOR THE “KILLER STRANGELET” SCENARIO
We turn now to the particulars of the catastrophe risk concerns raised over the RHIC and ALICE experiments,
and specifically to the hypothetical “killer strangelet” catastrophe scenario analysed in some detail by BJSW and
DDH. The “killer strangelet” scenario requires: (i) that stable strange matter exists, (ii) that a valley of stability
exists for negatively charged strangelets, (iii) that negatively charged metastable strangelets could be produced in the
≈ 40 TeV Au-Au ion collisions planned at RHIC, (iv) that a strangelet so produced could survive collisions which
bring it towards rest in surrounding matter, (v) that it would then fuse with nuclei, producing larger negatively
charged strangelets, in a runaway reaction which eventually consumes the Earth.6 The theoretical arguments [8,2]
against (i)-(iii) are generally regarded as convincing. If (i)-(iii) were nonetheless true, (iv) and (v) would also be
plausible.
If (i)-(v) were true, killer strangelets should also be produced in naturally occurring high energy heavy ion collisions,
which take place when cosmic rays collide with one another or with heavy nuclei in celestial bodies. Naturally produced
6Aficionados of understatement may admire BJSW’s description: [1] “a catastrophic process with profound implications for
health and safety”.
4
killer strangelets would be able to initiate runaway reactions capable of destroying asteroids, satellites such as the
Moon, or stars. From the fact that the Moon has survived for 4.5 billion years, and from the fact that astronomical
observations are not consistent with stars being converted into strange matter at any significant rate, bounds on the
risk of catastrophe at RHIC can be derived [8,2].
Unfortunately, these derivations require assumptions about the types of interaction which produce strangelets, the
velocity distribution of the strangelets produced, their interactions with nuclei, and their stability [8,2,14]. For this
reason, BJSW and DDH give various bounds, derived by making more or less conservative assumptions. Even the
weakest of these requires some assumptions [8,14].
Without knowing what level of confidence we can have in the relevant assumptions — a question which neither
group addresses quantitatively — it is difficult to see how the bound figures can really be meaningful [14]. But even
if the figures cannot really be justified, the comments made on them by BJSW, DDH and others give an interesting
and valuable insight into the risk criteria of physicists and administrators involved in RHIC policy.
Assuming that RHIC runs for the scheduled 10 years, DDH obtain pcatastrophe < 2 × 10
−8 for a fast catastrophic
destruction of the Earth and p < 2× 10−6 for a slow destruction that would be completed in the billion years before
the Sun expands beyond Earth orbit.
DDH describe these results as “a safe and stringent upper bound on the risk incurred in running [RHIC]”. They
add that the two bounds respectively imply that “it is safe to run RHIC for 500 million years” and that “running
the RHIC experiments for five million years is . . . safe”. These last two statements are, of course, incorrect. DDH’s
bounds, if valid, would establish only that it would be unlikely that the Earth would be destroyed very early in a
RHIC experiment run over the relevant periods: the bounds are consistent with a high probability of destroying the
Earth at some point during these hypothetically extended experiments.7
In the first version [1] of their paper, BJSW described DDH’s result as “a factor of 108 below the value required
for the safety of RHIC”. This, of course, is also incorrect: a risk bound 108 times that of DDH’s would be consistent
with a high probability of destroying the Earth within 5 years of the RHIC experiment — a risk level which even the
most gung-ho physicist could hardly describe as “safety”. Using their own independent analyses, BJSW derive results
that imply the following bounds from the survival of the Moon, given various assumptions (their Cases I-III) about
strangelet production, and again assuming that RHIC runs for the scheduled ten years: pcatastrophe <≈ 2 × 10
−10,
pcatastrophe <≈ 10
−4, pcatastrophe <≈ 2 × 10
−5. They described the second and third of these cases as still leaving
“a comfortable margin of error”. These comments, and that quoted at the start of this paragraph, are so obviously
inapplicable — no sane person would seek to reassure the public by suggesting that a risk bound of 1 in ≈ 10000 of
destroying the Earth represented a comfortable margin of error — that I suspect they must reflect some surprising
confusion on BJSW’s part at the time of writing Ref. [1].
BJSW refined their calculations in the second version of their paper, extracting an extra factor of ten and producing
bounds for a ten year run of the RHIC experiment of (Cases I-III): pcatastrophe <≈ 2 × 10
−11, pcatastrophe <≈ 10
−5,
pcatastrophe <≈ 2×10
−6. In this revised version, which followed criticisms of the comments noted above, no judgement
is made as to whether any of the bounds are satisfactory. To quote BJSW: “We do not attempt to decide what is
an acceptable upper limit on [pcatastrophe], nor do we attempt a ‘risk analysis’, weighing the probability of an adverse
event against the severity of its consequences.” [8] We use the revised bounds in the following discussion, referring to
them simply as BJSW’s bounds.
DDH’s main bound — pcatastrophe < 2×10
−8 over the 10 year life of RHIC — has been widely referred to [1,2,13,12]
in terms which suggest that it alone would be sufficiently reassuring to require no further analysis or risk optimisation.
My impression is that many numerate and thoughtful people would disagree. My own reasons for doing so are given
below.
V. RISK BOUNDS AND RISK ESTIMATES: AN IMPORTANT CAVEAT
It is important to stress that DDH’s and BJSW’s empirical arguments produce bounds on the risk of catastrophe,
not estimates of that risk.8 Their bounds are based on the fact that we do not observe something that we should
expect to observe if the risk were larger than some value p. A negative result of this form tells us nothing about the
7That these statements misrepresent their results was pointed out to DDH by the author in January 2000.
8In contrast, Compton’s reported statement on the risk of destroying life on Earth by a fission explosion is given in the form
of a risk estimate — though, as noted above, it was not justifiable.
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actual value of the risk. Everything in DDH’s and BJSW’s analyses is consistent with the true risk of catastrophe
being zero — and if current theoretical understanding is correct, the risk is indeed precisely zero.
When the destruction of the Earth is in question, though, it would be preferable not to have to rely on theoretical
expectations alone. As Glashow and Wilson put it [13], “The word ‘unlikely’, however many times it is repeated, just
isn’t enough to assuage our fears of this total disaster.” Hence the interest in looking at naturally occurring versions
of the experiment, verifying that they have not resulted in catastrophes, and so producing firm bounds on the risk of
catastrophe.
Unfortunately, this approach has its pitfalls and limitations. Comparing the effects expected from hypothetical
killer strangelets produced in naturally occurring heavy ion collisions and at RHIC is not completely straightforward.
Theoretical assumptions need to be made in order to derive risk bounds. Unless we are very confident indeed in
those assumptions, we cannot validly infer very small risk bounds this way [14,8]. And in any case, Nature may not
necessarily have done versions of the experiment we are interested in often enough to produce sufficiently strong risk
bounds.
How do we begin to decide what constitutes a sufficiently strong risk bound? It seems to me that the correct
approach in appraising risk bounds is to make worst case assumptions. So, if we are assured that pcatastrophe ≤ p0,
and we have to decide whether that bound alone is sufficient reassurance, we have to ask whether we would be happy
to proceed if we knew that pcatastrophe = p0. If not, then the bound alone is not sufficiently reassuring.
Such a bound might still form part of a compelling case for the safety of an experiment if it could be combined
with other arguments. For instance, in the case of RHIC, it might be argued that a combination of the theoretical
arguments and empirical bounds is sufficiently reassuring, even if neither would be alone.9
I will not consider such arguments here. Nor — to reiterate — do I examine whether the theoretical arguments
alone are sufficiently reassuring. The discussion below considers only the narrow question of whether the empirical
bounds alone would suffice.
VI. RISK VERSUS EXPECTATION
The destruction of the Earth would entail the death of the ≈ 6×109 human population and of all other species, the
loss of the historical record of the evolution of its biosphere, and the loss of almost all record of the culture developed
by humanity.10 Added to these are the opportunity costs arising from the absence of future generations.
Consider for the moment just the number of human deaths. If an experiment were expected to cause one human
death, in the everyday use of the term — that is, it was likely that at least one person would die as a result of the
experiment — its health and safety implications could not be said to be negligible. Now, when we are dealing with
small risks of large catastrophes, we cannot directly use this measure: an experiment with small risk is expected to
cause no human deaths, in the sense that this is the likeliest outcome. However, we can calculate a related measure:
the statistical expectation value of the number of human deaths. The expectation value of the number of human
deaths ensuing from an Earth-destroying catastrophe is Ed = pcatastropheN , where N ≈ 6× 10
9 is the current human
population.
So, if we accept Ed as an appropriate measure of the seriousness of a risk — and the next section explains why we
should — then any risk that does not satisfy
pcatastrophe ≪ 1.6× 10
−10 (1)
is not negligible.
Of the bounds above, neither of DDH’s ensure that (1) is satisfied, nor do the second and third of BJSW’s. BJSW’s
least conservative lunar survival bound (Case I) comes closer, but still fails unless a factor of 1/8 — i.e. in this case
a probability of 1/8 of causing one human death — is regarded as negligible.
9Arguments along these lines have been suggested in informal discussions, but to the best of my knowledge none has been set
out in print. Such an argument would need to be made very carefully, since the theoretical arguments and empirical bounds are
not independent. As already noted, the empirical bounds still rely on theoretical assumptions, and if theoretical expectations
were incorrect, the derivation of the empirical bounds might also be affected.
10A few spacecraft, including the message-bearing Pioneer and Voyager craft, would survive, as would the – continually
attenuating – electromagnetic signals generated on Earth.
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Making the comparison in terms of expectations, DDH’s main (tighter) bound implies that the expectation value
of the number of human fatalities caused by RHIC over ten years will not exceed 120. Put this way, this bound seems
far from adequately reassuring.
VII. IS THE EXPECTATION VALUE OF THE NUMBER OF FATALITIES RELEVANT?
It might perhaps be argued that the preceding calculation is misleading. After all, DDH’s bounds on pcatastrophe
represent probabilities small enough to be negligible in most circumstances. Most of us take 2 × 10−8 risks of death
in our stride: the risk of a typical US citizen dying in a shark attack in any given year is comparable. Translating the
bound value into Ed, the expected number of fatalities, makes it seem significant. But is it really reasonable to use
expected fatalities as a measure of the safety of a risk bound?
Actually, the next section argues that considering Ed alone still greatly underestimates the cost. But first let us
consider whether requiring Ed < 1 gives a sensible upper bound on negligible risk, assuming that it is agreed that the
certainty of causing one death would not be negligible. I believe most expert opinion would agree that it does, for the
following reasons.
First, everyone agrees that in carrying out any risk analysis we need the cost or utility of the various outcomes, not
merely their probability: a 10−3 chance of losing one dollar is better than a 10−3 chance of losing one million dollars,
and so on. Second, a fundamental principle of risk analysis is that in normal circumstances rational people are risk
averse. If X represents a random process whose possible outcomes xi have probabilities pi, and if V (xi) represents
the value to the community of outcome xi, then the value V (X) of a single run of X — that is, the value of allowing
precisely one of the xi to happen, with respective chances pi — is generally assumed to obey
V (X) ≤
∑
i
piV (xi) . (2)
The values of undesirable outcomes, of course, are negative: we refer to −V (xi) as the cost of xi. A second principle
is that the utility or cost function is concave. Applied to the cost of a loss of human lives, this implies that the cost
to society of N deaths is at least N times as great as the cost of 1 death: if xN and x1 represent the two events, then
V (xN ) ≤ NV (x1) (3)
The principles of risk aversion and concave utility explain, for example, why it can often be rational to take out
insurance, even though on average the insurance company expects to make a profit and the customer a loss. Similarly,
it explains why investors almost universally require investments that involve higher risk to offer a higher expected
profit in compensation. By considering a random process X with probability 2 × 10−8 of killing 6 × 109 people and
probability (1 − 2 × 10−8) of killing no one, we see these principles together imply that a 2 × 10−8 chance of killing
6× 109 people is at least as bad as the certainty of killing 120 people.
In summary, to demonstrate that the risk is negligible, we would need to show that Ed is considerably smaller than
one — precisely how much smaller depending on precisely how risk averse one is when it comes to global catastrophe.
Neither DDH’s nor BJSW’s bounds satisfy this criterion. To speak of the bounds being “safe and stringent” or
guaranteeing “comfortable margins of error” is, on this analysis, simply incorrect. Similarly, to demonstrate that the
risk is acceptable, it would be necessary (though not necessarily sufficient) to show that Ed is small enough that the
certainty of the experiment killing Ed people would be acceptable. Put another way, if it would be unacceptable for
the experiment to lead to the certain loss of Ed lives, then a risk at the bound value would be unacceptable.
Suppose, counterfactually, that we knew that the RHIC experiment were certain to kill precisely N people (and no
more). What value of N would be acceptable? Answers will vary, but my guess is that most would be somewhere
in the range < 10 or so. In particular, I think it clear that RHIC would not have obtained political authorisation
if it was thought certain to kill precisely 120 people: that would be regarded as an unacceptably high cost. From
the discussion of this section, it follows that a global catastrophe risk at the DDH bound value would be at least as
unacceptable.
Although the observations made in this section are elementary, it is worth noting that the CERN panel did not
acknowledge their validity. The response of Alvaro de Rujula, the panel leader, is accurately summarised by his
opinion, quoted in New Scientist [15], that it is “absurd” to take the risk bound probability and multiply it by the
global population. I recommend contemplation of this comment to anyone inclined to automatic faith in the risk
analysis expertise of scientists chosen by institutions to argue for the safety of their experiments.
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VIII. COMPARISON WITH EXISTING RISK POLICIES
DDH’s and BJSW’s risk bounds were presented and discussed by DDH [2] and BJSW [1], in a statement by John
Marburger, then director of Brookhaven [12], and in a commentary by Glashow and Wilson [13]. None of these
discussions make comparisons with risk criteria or optimisation procedures applied to other potentially hazardous
activities. This is unfortunate, since risk comparisons are generally illuminating, and in this case suggest that regarding
the risk bounds per se as adequate would be wildly inconsistent with at least some established policy.
For example, the UK National Radiological Protection Board requires that the risk of serious deleterious health
effects arising from a nuclear solid waste disposal facility must always be bounded at below 10−5 per year, that risk
optimisation procedures should be continued until the risk is below 10−6 per year, and that the risk of low probability
natural events which could lead to serious deterministic health effects should be separately bounded at 10−6 per
year [16]. The risk figures apply to the critical group of individuals, typically numbering between a few and a few
hundred, whose habits or location render them most at risk. Quite typically, the events whose risk is bounded would
be expected to kill fewer than 10 people.
In summary, according to established policy for these radiation hazards, it is not acceptable to incur a risk of greater
than 10−6 per year of killing ≈ 5 people. The risk aversion arguments of the last section suggest that a consistent
policy on catastrophe risk should treat a risk greater than 10−15 per year of killing the global population as even less
acceptable. An acceptable risk bound should thus imply
pcatastrophe ≪ 10
−15 per year . (4)
IX. FUTURE LIVES
The discussion so far has considered only the expected cost due to immediate human fatalities, neglecting the other
costs mentioned earlier. These are very hard to quantify in any commensurable way. (What is the value of the rest of
the biosphere compared to that of the human population? What price do we put on the historical record?) However,
it is, at least arguably, possible to assign a sensible and commensurable value to one of these further costs — the loss
of future generations — by estimating the number of future human lives which would not take place if the planet
were destroyed in the near future.
This line of argument cannot be followed without addressing two rather complex questions: Should we value our
successors’ lives as highly as those of our contemporaries? And can we say anything meaningful about the likely fate
of humanity over the billion years of life the Earth has left (or beyond)?
To the first, my own answer is “yes”, partly because I cannot see any good reason to prefer an unknown contemporary
to an unknown successor, and partly because it seems to me our lives have value in the first place largely because
they form part of ongoing human history. This view finds some support in established policy: the UK National
Radiological Protection Board guidlines cited above also explicitly state that those living at any time in the future
should be given a level of protection at least equivalent to that given to those alive now.
As for futurology, there are obviously so many unknowns that attempting detailed analysis seems pointless. I offer
only a crude calculation, which is obviously open to criticism, but at least suggests a starting point for discussion.
Suppose, optimistically, that humanity has a reasonable chance of surviving (in some form) for the lifetime of the
Earth. Suppose also that there is a reasonable chance of arranging things so that the sum global quality of life is
at least at the level of today, and the global population is roughly today’s: 1010 in round figures. And suppose
we neglect the possibility that the human lifespan may increase beyond 102, on the grounds that it is arguably
irrelevant: arguably, one can make a reasonable approximation — reasonable, that is, given the uncertainties in the
entire discussion — by considering the total number of person-years, so that for instance a 700-year life is equated
to seven 100-year lives. Let us also, conservatively, neglect the effect of migration to other planets some time in the
future, which would presumably (i) allow the human population to vastly increase over the next billion years and (ii)
permit humanity to survive beyond a billion years.
The cost of the destruction of the Earth today would then be roughly 101010−2109 = 1017 lives, or 107 greater than
the cost earlier calculated. Including this factor in the earlier calculation derived from the NRPB’s risk bounds would
mean that an acceptable risk bound should imply
pcatastrophe ≪ 10
−22 per year . (5)
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This further proposed tightening of risk bounds is controversial in all sorts of ways. To mention just one: regarding
the loss of future lives as a separate cost raises the question — a cost to whom? To those potential future generations,
deprived of the possibility of existence? To us, deprived of descendants and successors? Both, I think — but I concede
that both lines of thought raise some difficulties.
Another way of approaching the question is to ask a different hypothetical question: would it be far worse if all
of us (or all life on Earth) were killed than if almost all of us (or almost all life on Earth) were, supposing that in
the second case the planet remained otherwise fit for life? Answering “yes” suggests placing a high relative value
on future lives, since the number of immediate fatalities is almost the same in both cases. Those who answer “no”
will presumably not find any of the arguments of this section convincing. My impression is that the question has
not been widely enough debated for it to be possible to say which view (if either) reflects general opinion. For the
moment, then, whichever view one holds on future lives, it is worth bearing in mind that the majority view, on which
catastrophe risk policy should properly be based, may turn out to differ.
X. SOME COUNTERARGUMENTS
Calculations and comparisons are indispensable in rationalising risk policy and in highlighting inconsistencies.
However, there is no generally agreed set of principles from which we can decide policy in every instance. Politics do
not form a subset of mathematics. The above arguments could well be opposed on many different grounds. I consider
here some counterarguments which have been suggested to me in discussions.
• One obvious criticism is that the arguments above consider the cost of a catastrophe risk but not the benefits
gained by taking the risk. For that reason, it may be argued, they are bound to produce over-cautious prescrip-
tions. After all, no risk at all is worth taking unless there is some benefit. Without a cost-benefit analysis, no
sensible conclusion can be reached.
This is a partially fair criticism, but only partially. It should be stressed that it does not apply to the argument
of section VI, since using the number of deaths as a measure of safety is justified by comparing the implicit
cost-benefit tradeoffs in conclusions that would be generally agreed. It seems to me pretty uncontroversial that,
despite the benefits of RHIC, the experiment would not be allowed to proceed if it were certain (say, because
of some radiation hazard) to cause precisely 120 deaths among the population at large. If that is accepted, it
follows that a risk at the DDH bound value would be unacceptably high, even when the benefits of RHIC were
taken into account.
That said, some forms of cost-benefit analysis might indeed suggest that requiring pcatastrophe ≪ 10
−15 per
year or lower may be over-stringent. The likely immediate benefit of the RHIC experiments — advancing our
understanding of basic science — is not negligible. Moreover, the possible benefits presumably include at least
some probability — perhaps small, but not necessarily small compared to 10−15 — of contributing in some
presently unforeseen way to a discovery with a very large beneficial impact on future human lives. The foresight
problem is particularly acute here, of course, since one can also imagine low probability outcomes, other than the
catastrophe scenario, with a large negative impact. But, if one takes the view that scientific and technological
progress have on balance been beneficial and are likely to continue to be, the small possibility of a benefit that
would save (or enable) many future human lives gives, at least in principle, something to offset against the small
possibility of a catastrophe.
It is important to be clear, though, that by definition no cost-benefit argument could justify a claim that the
risks involved are negligible. Rather, it would make the case for proceeding with RHIC by suggesting that the
risks, though possibly not negligible, were justified by the benefits. This is not the case which has been made.
Such a case might or might not be widely accepted.
• It may be argued that the more stringent risk criteria suggested above for global catastrophe, even if rationally
justifiable in theory, are impossibly Utopian. If we took them seriously, and attempted to ensure that they were
satisfied before proceeding with any enterprise, we would stop, not only collider experiments, but many other
human activities. Progress would become impossible; life might be made unliveable.
Maybe — but I would be cautious about accepting this sort of defeatism too readily. We begin from a state
where risk bounds of 10−6 are used quite widely, for instance in the solid nuclear waste disposal guidelines
cited above. It does not seem obvious to me that, with careful attention to the problems, we could not ensure
that catastrophe risks associated to specific mechanisms are many further orders of magnitude smaller. On the
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contrary, it seems quite clear that in some cases catastrophe risk bounds could be substantially reduced. The
RHIC experiments are an excellent example: had the problem of reducing the risk bounds been taken seriously,
further theoretical research, perhaps combined with a tentative experimental programme aimed at carefully
testing our understanding of the new physics involved before running the full experiment, could almost certainly
have reduced the bounds very significantly.
Of course, this is not to say that risk avoidance is cost free. One has to accept that more stringent catastrophe
risk criteria might indeed delay or preclude at least some interesting future experiments. It seems to me we
just have to accept this as a fact of life. One cannot defensibly adopt a mindset which requires that every
interesting experiment must be carried out, and that sees every risk analysis as an exercise in justifying this
foregone conclusion. Human life, collectively as well as individually, is, after all, fragile. Our understanding of
nature is limited, and there are surely many dangers we have not yet appreciated. Due caution is appropriate.
We should not, in any case, rely on speculation about the implications of a more cautious catastrophe risk
policy. If it were to become clear that it would be effectively impossible to apply a policy on catastrophe risks
consistently, obviously that policy would need to be reconsidered. Unless and until carefully justified arguments
are made, identifying specific examples of problematic catastrophe risks, it seems premature to worry.
• The justifications given above for risk criteria may strike some as a bad policy guide, since they assume that
preserving human lives is in some sense a primary value against which our actions should be judged. Actually,
of course, we are guided by many other values. Few people consistently act so as to maximise their own life
expectation, for example: many risky pleasures are widely indulged in. Perhaps we should accept that what
applies to us as individuals applies also to us as a species: worrying about very small risks detracts too much
from the quality of our existence to be the best course.
This is certainly arguable. On the other hand, current risk policy tends to count the cost in human lives for a
good reason: because that particular value seems to be more widely shared and more strongly held than most.
It cannot possibly adequately represent the variety of individual values we bring to any policy debate, but it is
a measure which, by general consensus, is very important. Making a generally acceptable policy for extinction
risks on some other basis would require establishing a fairly firm consensus on what that basis should be. No
such consensus seems to exist at the moment.
• There is what might be termed the argument of dominant risk. We face many other extinction risks, some
natural (large asteroid impact), some wholly or partly self-created (global nuclear war, catastrophic extinction
of species as a result of human impact on the global ecosystem, catastrophic climate change as a result of human
impact on the global environment). There is a view which suggests that a new artificial risk is acceptable if it
is smaller than existing risks. A refinement of this view is that a new artificial risk is acceptable only if smaller
than presently unavoidable natural risks. In two further common variants of these two views, “smaller than” is
replaced by “very small compared to”.
Large asteroid impact seems to be the greatest known natural extinction risk that can be reasonably well
estimated. The risk of the Earth being hit by an asteroid of diameter 10 km is estimated to be 10−8 per year
[17]. Such an impact would be so devastating that it is generally thought very likely that it would cause mass
extinctions of species, and very plausible that we would be among the species extinguished. Accepting that
last hypothesis, perhaps at the price of another order of magnitude, gives an estimate of 10−8-10−9 per year
for this natural extinction risk. Following the argument of dominant risk leads to the so-called “asteroid test”,
according to which an artificial extinction risk is acceptable if smaller than ≈ 10−9 per year, or in the more
conservative version, very small compared to 10−9 per year.11
My impression from discussions is that many thoughtful people find some version of the argument of dominant
risk reasonable, but that many equally thoughtful people find this line of argument entirely irrational. My
sympathies are with the latter. Why should the existence of one risk, which may be distressingly high, justify
taking another easily avoidable risk, which, even if much lower, may still be unacceptably high? Unavoidable
natural risks are not normally believed to justify wilfully inflicting avoidable risks on third parties. Everyone
11Versions of the “asteroid test” have been discussed as possible justifications for the acceptability of the BJSW and DDH risk
bounds by several people involved in policy formation at CERN and Brookhaven: for example in W. Pratt et al., Brookhaven
National Laboratory Memo to T. Ludlam and J. Marburger, 17.2.00. The test is also considered in Ref. [18].
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now living is very likely to die within the next 120 years, and would be very likely to die of natural causes in
that timespan even if exposed to no other risks. An industry which added slightly to the natural risk level,
annually killing 10000 people who had made no choice to accept the extra risk, would not find much sympathy
for the defense that these extra deaths were more or less lost in the noise compared to natural wastage.
A further problem specific to the asteroid test is that it assumes that asteroid extinction risks are either
unavoidable or else, though avoidable in principle, small enough to be tolerable. In fact, the asteroid threat
is not unavoidable with current and foreseeable technology, and passive and active counter-measures are being
seriously considered.
That said, let me reiterate that many people seem to be persuaded by some version of the argument of dominant
risk. It no doubt deserves a more careful discussion than is given here. The above brief sketch of a counterar-
gument is not meant to dismiss the “asteroid test” and related criteria out of hand, but rather just to note that
there are serious counterarguments. I do not believe these criteria represent anything approaching a consensus
view. Unless and until it becomes clear that they do, they cannot legitimately be used to justify catastrophe
risks.
XI. FINAL COMMENT
The particular artificial extinction risk considered in this paper is hypothetical, and there are good arguments to
suggest that the actual risk is small or zero. But, as already noted, we face other undoubtedly real and not necessarily
small artificial extinction risks. The arguments above, which suggest that the true costs of extinction are generally
underestimated, obviously apply generally.
For instance, while the serious costs associated with artificially induced global warming are widely (albeit not widely
enough) appreciated, the extra cost associated with the small risk of a truly catastrophic climate change does not
seem to have been much considered. Yet it might be that, with proper accounting, the cost of the risk of climatic
catastrophe would be the greater. Similarly, although some (insufficient) attention is being paid to the costs associated
with the loss of biodiversity caused by human impact on the environment, the cost of the risk of a catastrophic collapse
of the global ecosystem seems to have been generally neglected.
In these and other areas where modelling is possible, the arguments above suggest we should encourage and pay
attention to research into unlikely but not inconceivable catastrophic outcomes, and try to quantify the risk they
represent, rather than focussing only on likelier outcomes which may be very deleterious but are not truly catastrophic.
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Note added July 2015 The previous arxiv versions and the published journal version of this article misstated
the most conservative of BJSW’s implied bounds (i.e. those consistent with the highest probability of catastrophe),
multiplying the probability by a factor of two.
As well as correcting this transcription error, I have taken the opportunity to add ≈ symbols to the relevant
figures in the paragraph stating BJSW’s various implied bounds. There are two reasons for this. First, BJSW’s
calculations produce rounded rather than precise figures. Second, precisely which catastrophe risk bounds one derives
from BJSW’s figures depends on precisely what sort of probabilistic reasoning one uses in considering the Moon’s
survival or destruction as a result of cosmic ray impacts and the Earth’s survival or destruction as a result of the
RHIC experiments. For example, should we derive risk bounds for RHIC in which we have 95% confidence, given
that the Moon has survived? Or 99% confidence? Or should we use some other approach? BJSW offer no concrete
proposal here.
It should however be stressed that, whatever approach is used, this last point does not allow much scope for
stretching the bounds. The stated risk bounds are derived from BJSW’s figures if one takes the probability of a
dangerous strangelet to be such that the expected number created over the lifetime of the Moon is one, which implies
a probability that the Moon survived to be (to very good approximation) e−1 = 0.3678 . . .. So, the stated risk bounds
are consistent with an appreciable probability of the Moon having survived. In other words, the survival of the Moon
does not give any clear evidence against a catastrophe risk at the level of the stated bounds. If we believe we should
reject hypotheses about strangelet creation only if they make the survival of the Moon seem pretty improbable, then
the stated risk bounds are justified. Indeed, if we followed one standard method and rejected hypotheses about
strangelet creation only if the Moon’s survival makes us at least (say) 95% confident that they are incorrect, we would
justify even weaker bounds (consistent with still higher catastrophe risks). In any case, BJSW’s figures are consistent
with a joint probability of both the Moon surviving to date and a hypothetical catastrophe at RHIC of e−1 times
the stated catastrophe risk bounds. Since the probability of hypothetical catastrophe at RHIC is at least as large
as this joint probability, it follows that (however one treats the separate events of Moon survival and hypothetical
RHIC catastrophe) no catastrophe risk bound better than e−1 times the stated figures can be derived from BJSW’s
calculations without introducing further assumptions that BJSW did not suggest in this part of their discussion. In
particular, on BJSW’s most conservative assumptions, no risk bound better than 1 in 36788 can be derived.
The omitted factor of 1/2 to BJSW’s most conservative implied risk bound probabilities makes no material difference
to the arguments of this paper. Nor would a further factor of up to e−1 to any of BJSW’s implied risk bound
probabilities do so. It is highly debatable whether any such factor should be included: to the best of my knowledge,
no one has argued that it should. As noted above, one can as well argue that risk bounds should be derived by
excluding only risk probabilities that make the Moon’s survival unlikely, in which case BJSW’s risk bounds should
be higher rather than lower. In any case, given the magnitudes of the other relevant figures in the argument, the
possibility of an extra factor of e−1 seems entirely moot. These corrections are made simply for the sake of accuracy.
A further small correction is that the risk bounds quoted from BJSW [1,8] corresponding to their Cases I-III
were previously listed in order of numerical size rather than in order of case number. To remove any possible
confusion, they are now listed above in case number order, so that for example the figures pcatastrophe <≈ 2× 10
−10,
pcatastrophe <≈ 10
−4, pcatastrophe <≈ 2× 10
−5 above correspond respectively to Case I, Case II, Case III of Ref [1].
I am very grateful to Eric Johnson for querying the previously stated figures and thus drawing my attention to the
need for correction, and for several other very helpful comments and suggestions.
Let me take the opportunity to add one other comment. As noted above, BJSW’s initial comments, characterising
a risk of 1 in ≈ 10000 of destroying the Earth as “a comfortable margin of error” [1], are obviously inapplicable, and
seem to reflect some surprising confusion on their part. Rereading their paper again prompted a guess at the nature
of that confusion. BJSW’s arguments take the following form
If there were a high probability (close to one) of strangelet-induced catastrophe at RHIC, then the expected number
of dangerous strangelets produced by cosmic rays impacting the Moon over its lifetime would be very high (104 or
higher).
Indeed, and it follows that the probability of the Moon having survived would be astronomically low (roughly e−10
4
or lower). This looks superficially enormously reassuring, given that the Moon has survived. The problem is that, to
argue for the safety of RHIC, we need to exclude not just a high probability of hypothetical catastrophe but also a
small but significant probability of hypothetical catastrophe. It might seem that the number e−10
4
is so small that
rescaling it by any significant probability will make no real difference. Unfortunately – and I wonder if this may be
the point BJSW overlooked – the relevant rescaling is in the exponent. As noted above, on BJSW’s most conservative
calculations, a probability of 10−4 of hypothetical catastrophe is consistent with a probability of e−1 of the Moon
surviving.
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